War, What is it Good for?

From ancient civilisations engaging in territorial disputes, to imperial conquests, ideological clashes and world wars; the trajectory of human history has been defined by the act of war. Yet the question of what war is truly and ultimately good for, still remains a highly debated topic amongst scholars.

Henceforth, this essay will aim to critically explore the advantages from both the side of the oppressor and the oppressed, as fundamentally, what is ‘good’ for an opposing force is paradoxically disadvantageous to the other. Utilising conceptual theories alongside case studies; the presented argument will be that war is inevitably beneficial for the victorious, whilst producing social phenomenons which is beneficial to those enacting   resistance. This will be demonstrated through the analysis of the War on Terror and the Falkland Islands conflict indicating the use of war as a declaration of a political agenda. As well as the influence war has on imperialist endeavours, studying the basis of the power dynamic and The Scramble for Africa. The penultimate focus will be on resistance, and how war can also be ‘good’ for the opposition, even when taking into consideration the imbalance of power globally.  Providing the concept that through the developing world of technology, one may argue that social media has aided the mobilisation and development of frameworks within resistance movements in times of war; with the current pro- Palestine protests being at the centre of the discourse. To then subsequently conclude on a critical analysis of foreign aid, discussing how in this case; benefits and impediments can be identified on both factions; emphasising war is primarily ‘good’ for the dominant force; thus, those on the against must continue to employ any instruments provided by the social environment that war can often produce.

When exploring the assets and liabilities of war, one should start with the very origin and definition of the word. When referring to old English, war can be defined as, ‘Hostile contention by means or armed forces, carried on between nations, states, or rulers, or between parties in the same nation or state…against a foreign power or against an opposing party in the state’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 1921). However, as modern events have proven; the semantics of war have been substituted with a malleable construct. States are able to utilise expressionism and realism to their advantage, dismissing that the ‘virtue of our definition is that it allows us to see precisely what is distinctive about constructivism’, (Schwartz and Velasco, 2019). This has directly influenced the Jus ad Bellum and jus in bello reflections of war; meaning ‘decision-makers often believe that war works- that it is effective, and moreover that war can achieve objectives at a comparatively low cost’, (Crawford, 2016). Subsequently, these objectives have become ingrained in the lexicon as an integral component of scrutinising relationships characterised by dynamics pertaining to power, confrontation, and coercion. This is what Habermas (1989) labels as ‘sub-systems’; and that political ideologies are now at the forefront of motives for war as a ‘consequence of bellicosity’ (Black, 2007). Ultimately war is good for legitimising a political agenda and as a global declaration of beliefs. This notion, however, is not academically ignored. For instance, at the University of Edinburgh, a three-day conference was held in 2017 in which the term, War Through Other Stuff (WTOS) was constructed. WTOS demonstrates that ‘traces of war can be found even in the most unexpected places’, (Whitmore, 2021), as well as including the anthropological aspects of war such as political and cultural shifts within the targeted country. WTOS links directly with the Diversionary Theory of War (DTW) (Grandpierron, 2022). The DTW posits that leaders may initiate international conflicts to divert attention from domestic issues, fostering national unity and support. In essence, engaging in a war or external conflict can serve as a strategic distraction from internal problems, potentially bolstering the leader’s popularity and consolidating political power. Principally DTW employs, ‘economic and sociological models putting emphasis on leaders’ calculation of expected gains and losses’, (de Mesquita et al., 2003). In short, how war would be good for their political stance.

When empirically evidencing war as a benefit for political leaders; the Falkland Islands conflict is undeniably confirmation. For instance, the 1981 Defence White Paper, titled “The UK Defence Programme: The Way Forward”, constituted a significant evaluation of the United Kingdom’s defence policy initiated by the Conservative government led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Crafted primarily by the then Secretary of State for Defence, John Nott, the review aimed to curtail spending amid the early 1980s recession and prioritise support for NATO over extraterritorial operations. The cut in spending left Thatcher with the worst historical results in   for popularity polling (41%). The DTW framework has gained traction as a rationale for interpreting the Falkland Islands conflict. It suggests that Thatcher’s choice to reclaim the Falkland Islands was driven by a desire to salvage her political standing and divert attention from her domestic policies. The “Falklands Factor” as now commonly referred to; could be seen as the political making of Thatcher.  In fact, “public opinion of Thatcher changed after the war to a more positive stance’, (Freedman, 1982); as well as her approval ratings rising from the previously mentioned 41% in April to 59% as Britain recaptured the Falkland Islands. However, the DTW approach does have limitations best identified with the risk factor of destabilisation; exemplified with the Iraq war, which created a vacuum environment seizable by ISIS; at cause of the puppet governments creating the idea of a kakistocracy authority within Iraq. Albeit war can be beneficial for ideological agendas and political programs; factors such as justification, geopolitical goals and timing should not be so quickly dismissed.

Secondly, war can be ‘good’ for highlighting the power dynamics within international relations, benefiting imperialistic endeavours. As Tilly (1975) expressed, ‘wars make states, and states make war’.  This is at direct consequence of leaders having to be, in some way, confident that they are stronger than the opposition; mentioned earlier with DWT. Singly they must believe that they will be victorious; thus, the dominating force.  This strength can be exemplified through numerous channels; for instance, international exclusion has been perceived as an appropriate means of gaining resources in power struggles, including slander and boycotting. What was once controlled by resources is now dictated by social scandals and populist cultures. Empirically this is expressed via the de facto of ‘most western countries did not attend Russia’s 2015 victory day parade’, (Chun, 2018). This emphasises the point, power comes in many forms and war is ‘good’ at portraying this.

Power may have been most accurately written about within the work of, ‘The Art of War’, by Sun Tzu (5th century BC); employing the use of intelligence and covert strategic methods. Although written in antiquity it encompasses the modern beliefs that power compounds and is never static. Ultimately power produces power as well as, powerlessness produces power; this in turn influences the civic arena. In similar thought, academics have explored the relationship between power shifts and the likelihood of war. The ‘Power Cycle Theory’, (Dorian, 1983) is a dual-component theory addressing the interplay between relative capability dynamics and the onset of major wars. The non-linear evolution pattern of a state’s relative capability, applicable to key state system members, delineates its systematic role. War tends to be most probable during four pivotal circumstances: significant shifts in a state’s power position and international political role, coupled with abrupt inversions in dynamics, foreign policy misperception, and heightened over-reaction: i.e power transference.

Power shifts can be identified within imperialistic endeavours which history has proven war is very good for.

A strong case example for this would be the Scramble for Africa. Occurring in 1884, the Berlin Conference, convened by German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, brought together 12 influential European countries, along with the USA and the Ottoman Empire. This marked a pivotal moment in the expansion of the British Empire, with Africa becoming a new arena of influence. In the 1870s, only about 10% of Africa was under European control, a figure that had surged to 90% by 1914. Ethiopia and Liberia stood as the sole African nations avoiding European dominance, though Italy briefly occupied Ethiopia in 1936. Some historians argue that the post-Berlin Conference era should be recognised as the second stage of the British Empire, as Britain acquired 20 new colonies, solidifying its status as one of the most powerful European nations.  A powerful statement was portrayed with the absence of any African leaders and authorities at attendance, inferring a ‘domnium’ (van der Linden, 2016) continent. In addition, diplomats used their knowledge of, ‘African geography to implement colonial and diplomatic strategies that aimed at outcompeting rival powers. The development of a network of actors with scientific, colonial and diplomatic expertise was crucial for the negotiations’ (Gabito-Marques, 2020). Hence proving war is good for those with surplus power, through the colonisation of Africa, however devastating for the independence of those countries.

On the contrary, war can also be ‘good’ for the mobilisation of resistance groups; through social phenomena created by the dynamics previously discussed. This is most appropriately observed through the teachings of Angela Davies (2012) who once declared, ‘we know the road of freedom has always been stalked by death’. This is perhaps referring to the work of resistance groups in times of conflict and war, and the utilisation of framework structures alongside the brutality of battle. Many academics as well as activists have explored the interaction of factors involved with achieving a successful resistance. This relationship has been further investigated within the discipline of social psychology with the likes of Asch, Zimbardo and Rotter indicating the cognitive processes involved with social conformity and defiance. Thus, resistance is not simply the act of resistance but a greater more powerful form of social identity and an illustration of the ‘minimal group paradigm’ (Tajafel, 1970); that all that is necessary for a resistance group to form is to exhibit discrimination against ‘an out-group’, and that intergroup conflict is not required for the same affects. The behaviours of the resistance groups have then been further studied by sociologists and scholars attempting to label and identify the key points of progress, for replication across all resistance. For instance, ‘(1) the structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement; (2) the forms of organisation (informal as well as formal), available to insurgents; and (3) the collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action’ (McAdam, 1996). However, as media becomes more and more apparent in resistance and with the direct content from the victims, one may ask how these frameworks have adapted; as now what was once the cultivator of protests (public spaces) are now being seen as ‘dead capitial’ (Gerbaudo, 2012). Despite this, the development of technology, the popularity of protest movements has surged as have mobilisation through abundance of connectivity. One suggestion of this upsurge is the effects of ‘info-capitalism’ (Mason, 2016).  Info-Capitalism refers to the abundance of materials available since neoliberalism; stating that knowledge is no longer a resource, but the resource which leads to the benefit of ‘organisational hybridity…the affordances of digital media and long-term shifts towards personalisation, political consumerism and post materialistic lifestyle politics’ (Bennet, 1998).

            In all, we link the appeal of personalised digital interaction to the libertarian origins of techno-utopianism. It is contended   that, coupled with a mobilisation driven by digital enthusiasm, this connection poses potential democratic and organisational shifts. This has been investigated within studies conducted in Spain and Cambodia, providing multicultural validity. Case in point Lee (2018) discovered, even in an authoritarian regime, social media tactics were being employed by the young civic actors of Cambodia. This involved, neutrality tactics; reposting content without adding any discourse for less liability; artistic and cultural contention; channelling anger through events such as Khmer New year gate; hiding in plain sight with coded messages; as well as non-confrontational tactics, engaging with state actors online. Scholars are able to illustrate the transition from collective action to connective action in times of war.

Be that as it may, what is advantageous for resistance can be equally as beneficial for the oppressors.

This paradigm is best exemplified with the pro-Palestinian protests taking place globally and the far-right disturbances that occurred on Armistice Day, in London. Consequently, the connective action of pro-Palestinian campaigners led to protests in over 10 different countries: including staged sit ins, blocked vehicles and thousands in participation. The rapid speed in which the movement was able to organise and mobilise was unprecedented. However, simultaneously, media created a vacuum of right-wing fury as Suella Braverman (the Home Secretary at the time) stated, ‘right wing protesters were rightly met with a stern response from the Police, whilst pro-Palestinian mobs were largely ignored’.  Ergo hundreds of right-wing protestors marched, due to the abundance of information on the organisation of the pro-Palestine protests; subsequently, over one hundred arrests were conducted predominantly for the counter protestors. Therefore, whilst there is sufficient evidence to suggest war is good for the mobilisation of resistance groups, technological development can be easily employed to counterattack.  

An international foreign policy that illustrates such a paradox; is the involvement of foreign aid as a byproduct of war, and how it may be an advantageous element of war. Foreign aid encompasses the provision of resources, such as financial aid, technical expertise, or material support, from one country to another. The primary goal is to foster economic development, alleviate poverty, and address pressing global issues. Governments, international organisations, and non-governmental entities are key contributors to foreign aid efforts, aiming to enhance the well-being and stability of recipient nations. However, foreign aid continues to be a topic of controversy as researchers study the gap ‘between what aid does and what it could potentially achieve’ (Riddell, 2016).  Hence, attempting to provide a balanced argument identifying whether foreign aid in times of conflict could be seen as another element illustrating what ‘war is good for’, for either side of the theoretical dynamics of war.  There are two primary criticisms of foreign aid that should be discussed; firstly, what foreign aid should be doing to increase the positive effectivity, and secondly, the effect foreign aid has on international relations and global manipulations exerting the power dynamics.

To begin there has been preliminary reports as well as evaluations of certain foreign aid programs indicating, ‘no robust evidence…that endorsed countries have systematically out-performed in-endorsed ones’ (Riddell & Nino-Zarazua, 2016). This has been identified to be a consequence of limited capacity development. It must be noted that this is not an unspoken issue amongst donors. In essence, capacity development refers to challenges such as insufficient coordination among donors, leading to duplication of efforts and fragmented initiatives. Additionally, recipient countries may face difficulties in effectively absorbing and utilising aid due to governance issues, lack of institutional capacity, and limited local ownership. Sustainable capacity development requires a tailored approach that considers the specific needs and context of each country, addressing these challenges to ensure long-term impact and self-sufficiency.  This is further associated with transferability, the concept that there is obvious good reason for foreign aid, ‘the problem is to come up with the right programs’ (Huntington, 1970); and though there has been active progress to resolve these issues, many produced by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNSECO); one should consider the impact of ineffectual fundamental principles, and what these faults can produce. Namely, China’s involvement with debt trade diplomacy and the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s debt-trap diplomacy refers to a strategy where China extends loans to developing countries, often for large infrastructure projects, creating economic dependency. If a borrower struggles to repay, China may gain leverage by taking control of strategic assets or acquiring influence. This practice has been associated with concerns about debt sustainability and potential political implications for recipient nations. Furthermore, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a massive infrastructure and economic development project led by China. Launched in 2013, it aims to connect Asia with Europe and Africa through a network of roads, railways, ports, and other infrastructure projects. While BRI has the potential to spur economic growth, critics argue that it can lead to debt dependency, lack of transparency, and environmental concerns. The intersection of these practices has raised questions about the geopolitical implications of China’s expanding influence, which foreign aid has been a catalyst to. Thus, indicating that war can be ‘good for’ exerting power through foreign aid as ‘this symbolic transformation, in turn, euphemisms the material hierarchy underlying the donor-recipient relation. In this process, recipients become complicit in the existing order that enables donors to give in the first place’ (Hattori, 2001).

Regardless of that, foreign aid has been empirically proven to have some beneficial effects for the recipient, referring specifically to South Korea. For instance, the U.S., along with the United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), and UNSECO; provided substantial economic aid through programs like the Marshall Plan, and military aid to ensure South Korea’s security. This support, combined with effective governance and strategic economic policies, contributed to South Korea’s remarkable transformation. Over time, South Korea evolved from a war-torn nation into an economic powerhouse, showcasing the positive impact foreign aid can have on a country’s development. Ergo when implemented efficiently, ethically with room for capacity development and transferability, foreign aid can be seen as a positive consequence of war; often funding groups that would have otherwise been self-reliant. Whilst simultaneously demonstrating that like most aspects of war, the oppressive force will utilise any material to their advantage seen within the foreign diplomacy of China.

All things considered when referencing Edwin Starr (1970), ‘what is war good for…absolutely nothing’, research has proven quite contrary. War is in fact good for both the oppressed and the oppressive due to byproducts of the act of war itself. The international procedures as well as diplomatic motivations that are established during times of war, create an environment that can potentially aid resistance with mobilisation and resources; whilst concurrently producing the seedbed for global manipulation by the dominant force via covert strategic methods of power.

What is advantageous for one force is consistently evidenced to be disadvantageous for the opposition; signifying that one body can both be for and against war.

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